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I
i. The exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary Systeml)
July 1978 the European Council of the heads of state and government agreed
in Bremen to the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS). The
main features of the system were set out at the Brussels meeting of the
Council in December 19782).
The EMS went into operation as of March 13, 1979,' after certaín questions
relating to the common agricultural policy had been resolved. At the same
time, the 'snake-arrangement' for the exchange rates of some member states
of the European Community - Belgium, Denmark, France (untíl March 1976),
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West-Germany - ceased to exist. All former
member countries of the European Community, except the United Kingdom,
decided to particípate in the EMS, includíng the exchange rate mechanísm.
The United Kingdom did not take part in the operational heart of the EMS,
the exchange rate mechanism. More recent members of the European Community
- Greece (from 1981), Spain and Portugal (from 1986) - also did not join
the EMS. Nevertheless, the pound sterling and the Greek drachma are
included in the basket that forms the European Currency Unit (ECU), which
serves as a numéraire for the exchange rate mechanism, as a denominator for
the intervention mechanism and as a reference point for the divergence
indicator. The exchange rate and intervention mechanism of the EMS is made
up of two separate but overlapping components, i.e. the 'parity grid' and
the 'divergence indicator'. The parity grid is a matrix of bilateral
central rates, around which fluctuatíon margins have been established, and
is broadly similar to the previous snake-arrangement. The divergence indi-
cator shows the movement of the exchange rate of each currency against the
weightr~d average movement of the other currencíes and aims to identify at
an early ~tage when one particípating currency ls begtnning to diverge from
the other currencies within the EMS.
1) The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Hans Visser for helpful com-
ments and Mr. Jan Willem in 't Veld for his valuable research assis-
tance.
2) The objective of the EMS has been stated as a'zone of monetary stabili-
ty in Europe'. See European Economy, no. 3(July 1979), p. 9u.
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1.1. The parity grid and the relative positions of the curreneies
All participating currenciesl) have a central rate or parity expressed ín
terms of the ECU. By dividing these central rates vis-à-vis the ECU through
each other the bilateral central rates or cross-parities are determined.
Thereby a parity grid is generated with intervention limits 2,25~ above and
below thc bilateral central rates and thus a maxímum fluctuatíon range of
4,5~ around these rates was allowed. Only Italy as a former non-snake-
country opted for a(temporarily) wider fluctuation margin of plus or minus
6~ instead of the regular 2,25~. Each central bank is obliged to intervene
in order to keep the market rate for its own currency within the bilateral
intervention limits. When a bilateral intervention limit is approached, the
central banks of the countries concerned must intervene in the exchange
market to unlimited amounts. The central bank with a strong currency will
buy the weak currency, while the central bank with a weak currency will
sell the strong currency. However intervention ín other currencies - mainly
U.S. dollars - is allowed and has been undertaken. The commitment to inter-
vene may put a heavy burden on the countríes wíth weaker currencies,
because the possibly extensive and prolonged íntervention will diminish
their stock of official reserves. To prevent too much pressure on the
mechanism, timely and smooth adjustments of the central rates - called 're-
alignments' - were permitted subject to mutual agreement by a common proce-
dure, which involved all participating countries. Such realignments had to
guard the EMS against becoming a rigid system like the snake-arrangement,
which the weaker countries would leave as soon as they could no longer meet
the obligation to intervene. Up to August 1986 nine realignments have taken
place during the EMS. Therefore the system is one of fixed but adjustable
exchange rates between the seven currencies.
The parity grid of bilateral central rates and intervention limits is the
core of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. The bilateral market rates
within this grid c~,n be cilternatively represented by the 'relative posi-
tions' of Lhe currencies within the EMS-band of fluctuation. The relative
1) Herewith is referred to the currencies of the countries which partici-
pate in the exchange rate mechanísm of the EMS, i.c. the Belgian-
Luxembourg franc, Danish krone, Deutsche mark, Dutch guilder, French
franc, Irish pound and Italian lira.
j
Figure I. The r.~lativ~~ hositionti ut thr EMS-rurri~ncies ( lavt frid;ry ~if th~~ month ).
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Source: De Nederlandsche Bank ( Dutch central bank ).
positions of the various EMS-currencies are shown in figure 1 for the
period fr~om April ly'T9 up to December 1984.
When the relative position of a currency reaches the upper or lower limit
of the EMS-band of fluctuation, the central bank of the country concerned
must intervene in the exchange market. Thus this band is to be conceived as
a target zone for the external value of each currencyl). The relative
position indicates the position of a currency ín~relation to two other
currencies within the EMS, namely the strongest currency and the weakest
currency. 'Chese are the currencies which are the closest to the respective
upper and lower intervention limit of the EMS-band of fluctuation.
If Ht and H' are the bilateral market and central rate of the strongest
currency vis-à-vis any other currency Z, then the appreciation of the
strongest currency against its central rate is in period t:
~
Ht - H
H L - ~-
H
The 'reference-currency' Z may be any currency wíthin the EMS, except the
Italian lira. Furthermore, if Lt and L~ are the bilateral market and
central rate of the weakest currency vis-á-vis the same currency Z, then






The average of the appreciation of the strongest currency and the deprecia-
tion of the weakest currency [1~2(Ht t Lt)] determines the 'central posi-
tion' within the EMS-band of fluctuation, which is shown in figure 1 as the
zero-line. Similarly, if Xt and X~ are the bilateral market and central
rate of a certain currency X vis-à-vis currency Z Z), then the apprecia-
tion or depreciation of that currency X against its central rate is in
period t:
1) Since the currencies in the EMS are floating as a block against third
currencies, there is no absolute measure against which the relative
appreciation or depreciation of each eurrency can be calculated.
Sef, B:ink of England, Intervention arrangements in the European Monetary
System, Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 19, June 1979, p. 191.
2) The reference-currency Z may also be the currencies H, L or X, although
small differences in approximatíon could occur. To avoid these, the
weakest currency L can be chosen as reference-currency (Z ~ L). Cf.
Central Bank of Ireland, A Guide to the Arithmetic of the EMS Exchange-






Finally, the 'relative posit.ion' of currrncy X within the EMS-band of fluc-
tuation can be defined as the appreciation or depreciatíon of currency X
vis-á-vis the central position (zero-line) and is therefore in period t:
(4) EMSt - Xt - 1~2(Ht t Lt)
Thus a r~elative position expresses at any moment the position oP a currency
with regard to both extreme EMS-currencies and reflects in this way the
strength of a currency. It is important to realize that these two extremes
(H and L) are not always the same currencies, but can alternate from time
to time.
Because the intervention limits within the parity grid lie 2,25~ above and
below the central rates or parities, the maximum deviation between the
strongest and weakest currency within the EMS-band must be 2,25~ as well.
In case the strongest currency is e.g. 2,25~ above par vis-à-vis another
currency, it implies that the last currency have to be the weakest in the
system. No other currency - the Italian lira left aside - can fall below
this currency for its bilateral intervention limít against the strongest
currency would then be exceeded. Therefore, the maximum and minimum
relative positions of each currency (except the Italian lira) are t1,125
and -1,125 respectively and these correspond with one or more upper and
lower intervention limits within the parity grid.
When the strongest currency reaches a relative position of t1,125 and the
weakest currency of -1,125, the central banks concerned roust intervene in
the exchange marketl).
Until now the Italian lira was left out of consideration. The relative
position of the lira within the EMS-band of fluctuation is defined in the
same way as the appreciation or depreciation of the lira vis-à-vis the
central position ín períod t:
(5) EMStL - ILt - lI2(Ht t Lt)
1) The relative positions of the strongest and weakest currency lie natu-
rally symmetrical wíth regard to the central position (zero-líne)
within the EMS-band.
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where ILt is the appreciation or depreciatíon of the lira against its
central rate vis-à-vis currency Z. On account of the wider intervention
limits for the Italian lira within the parity grid (t 6~), the central
position is determined by the strongest and weakest of the other EMS-
currencies. Consequently, when the relative position of the lira lies
between t 4,875 and t 6~, the central bank of Italy can be forced to inter-
vene. Thus in interpreting the relative positions of the other EMS-
currenc,ies, the relative position of the lira should be considered also.
1.~'. The divergence indicator
The second component of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS is the
'divergenee indicator', which can be regarded as a supplement to the parity
gridl). In particular the former non-snake countries - France, Ireland
and Italy - f'avoured a system in which the currency with the greatest devi-
ation from the weighted average of the EMS-currencies should carry the
burden of adjustment. Within the parity grid with bilateral fluctuation
margins it might happen that, if an important currency like the Deutsche
mark e.g. strongly appreciates vis-á-vis the other currencies, one of those
currencíes would be the first to reach the intervention limit against that
strong currency.
Such a situation within the EMS-band is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2. An asymmetrical situation within the EMS-band
H
t1,125 ~ upper i ntervention limit
0
-1,125
----------------- ~------------------ central position
lower intervention limit
L
1) For an e;xtensive discussion of the 'divergence indicator' see e.g. J.
Salop, The Divergence Indicator: A Technical Note, IMF Staff Papers,
vol. 28, t981, PP. 682-697.
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Therefore, thc~ countries with weak currencies wanted a system which indi-
cates the relative deviations of the currencies from the weighted average
movement within the EMS, as reflected by the appreciation or depreciation
of the (;CU against its central rate. The country of the currency wíth the
greatest deviation vis-à-vis the ECU should take appropriate measures to
reduce this deviation.
As seen above, the maximum allowed deviation from the bilateral central
rates is 2,25`b. If the weight of a currency X within the ECU-basket is
called WX, then the 'maximum divergence spread' SX is:
(6) SX ~ t 2,25 (1-WX) .
This is the maxímum possible deviation between the ECU-market rate and the
ECU-central rate of that currency X and wíll be achíeved when the currency
is at its interventlon limit.
Furthermore, for currency X a'threshold of divergence' TX ls set at 75~
of its maximum divergence spread SX:
(7) T - t 0,75 [2,25(1-W )]
X X
Thus the threshold of divergence takes account of the weight of each
currency in order to eliminate its influence on the probability of reaching
a threshold in case of an unilateral movement of that currency. Moreover,
the 'divergence indicator' It for currency X in períod t ís defined as the
relative deviation between the ECU-market rate of that currency (ECUt)









1) The divergence indicator can be pulled out of true by the Italian Lira
and the pound sterling, which are included in the ECU-basket, but to
which apply wider (t 6~) or no bilateral fluctuation margins. To
neutralize these distortions, the divergence indicator is adjusted by
eliminating the movements of the lira and the pound sterling beyond the
fluctuation margin of t 2,25~. This adjustment is approximate and
therefore questionable.
See Nationale Bank van België, Het Europees monetaír stelsel, Tljd-
schrift van de Nationale Bank van Belgi~, vol. 54, July-August 1979,
Pp. 39-41.
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So the divergence indicator will be zero, when the ECU-market rate equals
the ECU-central rate, in other words if the movement of this currency
against its central rate exactly corresponds with the weighted average
movement of the EMS-currencies. In case the divergence i ndicator exceeds
t75~ or falls below -75~, the threshold of divergence ís crossed and the
~~~~ncerrning country wi11 hE~ presum~rd t.o take :rdequate mt~a~ure~s, such as dt-
versified intervention, realignment of cer,Lral ratés, or measures of domes-
tic monetary and economic policy. Nevertheless, no country can be compelled
to take these measures within the system of the divergence indicator.
Hence, the divergence indicator is relegated to a minor role withín the
EMS. It acts as an early warning system without any commitments. In
addition the divergence indicator has some practical drawbacks. Firstly,
the use of the indicator does not lead necessarily towards monetary
stabilization, but rather induces a tendency towards the average monetary
development within the EMS. Secondly, the indicator works only as a warning
system if one currency clearly diverges from the other currencíes. However
it fails when two currencles strongly move in oppo~lte dlrecttons and the
other" rurrencies are in the middle, because then no dívergence threshold
could be crossed. Finally, the indicator would operate better as a signal
by lowering the divergence threshold e.g. from 75 to 50R of the divergence
spread, but this would also imply a very frequent crossing of the threshold
making the indicator worthlessl). In future the subordinated system of
the divergence indicator will therefore be left aside because of its small
importance.
1.3. The determinants of the relative positíon of the currencies
The exchange rate mechanism of the EMS consists of a grid of bilateral
fluctuation margins supplemented by a warning system of weighted divergence
thresholds vis-à-vis the ECU. This was a political compromise between the
former snake-countries, which favoured a continuation of the snake-arrange-
ment, and the non-snake-countries, which advocated a different mechanism.
That compromise can be characterized as a system of managed floating market
rates (relative positions) around a fixed but adjustable central rate
(central poyition). Within the established intervention limits the market
1) For a description of these drawbacks see H. Ungerer, The European
Monetary System: The Experience, 1979-82, Occasional Paper no. 19,
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., May 1983, pp. 15-16.
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rates (relative positions) are able to move freely depending on the demand
and supply of these currencies.
Henceforth, we shall focus on the EMS-band of fluctuation and in particular
on the determinants of the relative positions of the EMS-currencies. The
relative position does not reflect a term of exchange between two curren-
cies, but a multilateral position of one currency against the others~).
Thus the determinants of the relative position of~a certain currency refer
in principle to all EMS-countries instead of only two countries, as in the
case of bilateral exchange rates. Therefore, the explanation of a relative
position is more complicated and less straightforward than that of a
bilateral rate. Moreover, the fluctuations of relative positions will be
more difficult to test empirically than those of bilateral rates, because
they are more limited.
What are the determinants or explanatory variables of the relative posi-
tions of the EMS-currencies? First of all, the relative positions are
determined by exchange market interventions or changes in the official
reserves of the central banks. A high relative position can the central
bank concerned force to intervene by selling its own strong currency in
exchange for a weak currency or dollars.
Then the relative position will fall. Consequently, changes in the official
reserv~,s of the centra] bank have a negative influence on the relatíve
pusition of its currency~). Further, the relative positions are affected
by balsnc:e of' payments dísequillbrí,~ of the countries. A surplus on the
current account or the capital account of the balance of payments of a
country will increase the relative position of its currency. Thus the
accounts of the balance of payments have a positive effect on the relative
position of a country's currency. However, capital flows between countries
are primarily caused by differences in the rate of return on various liquid
assets between these countries. Therefore, the most important determinant
of the relative positions is the difference in the interest rate between
the EMS-countries, particularly in the money market interest rate. Given
1) Strictly speaking it is a relation between three currencies, namely of
one currency (X) vis-à-vis the strongest currency (H) and the weakest
currency (L) within the EMS-band, which can alternate from time to time.
For this reason a determinant of the relative position will often be
approximated by the difference of a domestic variable and its weighted
average counterpart for the EMS-countries.
2) Notice that an appreciation (depreciation) of a currency corresponds
with a rise (fall) of the relative position of the currency and a fall
(rise) of the exchange rate of a foreign currency expressed in that
currency on definitional grounds.
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the domestic interest rate in a country, a rise of the interest rate(s) in
the other EMS-countries will induce capital export and will result in a
fall of the relative position. In this context the Fisherian distinetion
between nominal and real interest rates may be essential. If the nominal
interest rate in the other EMS-countries rises because of an acceleration
of the expected inflation, then the relative position will not decrease but
increase. For this reason it is decisive for the d~rection of the influence
of nominal interest rate differences, whether these differences are caused
by real interest rate differences, or by divergent inflatlonary expecta-
tions within the EMS. Apart from the expected ínflation rate the actual
inflatíon rate is also important, mainly in the longer term. A higher
actual inflation rate in a country compared with the other EMS-countries
will in the long run result in a fall of the relative position of its
currency. Nevertheless, the inflation rate differences wíthin the EMS
affect above all the central rates and positions of the currencies and are
consequently reflected in the realignments of these currencíes. In many
cases, then the central rates of the countries with high inflation are
devaluated and those of the countries with low inflation revaluated. So the
short-term development of the relative positions is principally freed from
this influence.
2. An empirical study of the relative positions of the currencies:
April 1979 - December 1984.
Now the actual development of the relative positions of ttie EMS-currencies
will be empirically analyzed and explained by the above mentioned deter-
minants for the period from April 1979 up to December 1984. First the
realignments of the central rates within the EMS need further examination.
During the sample period the bilateral central rates have been seven times
adjusted by one or more countries and after this period another two times.
All realignments up to August 1986 are shown in table 11).
1) The realignrnents arr~ calculated as the percentage change of' a currency
~rg.rinsL th~: other EMS-currencie~s. For a detailed discussion of these
re~lignmf.nts see J. van Ypersele, "IT~e Europcan Monetary System:
origins, operations and outlook, European Perspectíves Series, Brus-
sels, 1985, pp. 81-86 and European Economy, supplcanent A, September
198~ and April 1986.


























24 Sep[ember 1979 ~2.0 - - - - -2.9 - DÁ9A
30 November 1979 - - - - - -4.8 - DÁ9B
23 March i981 - - - -6.0 - - - DRIA
5 October 1981 i5.5 -3.0 ~5.5 -3.0 - - - DRIB
22 February 1982 - - - - -8.5 -3.0 - DR2A
14 June 1982 ~4.25 -5.75 t4.25 -2.75 - - - DR2B
23 March 1983 ~5.5 -2.5 ~3.5 -2.5 ~1.5 f2.5 -3.5 DR3
i i
22 July 1985 ~2.0 ~2.0 r2.0 -6.0 ~ ~2.0 i2.0 i~2.0 ~ -
6 April 1986 f3.0 -3.0
I
i3.0 - ~I.O ~I.O - -
Even in the beginning of the EMS realignments appeared to be necessary,
although they affected just one or two currencies. However, in 1981 a
drastic realignment was triggered off for more currencies because of the
sharp fall of the French franc after the presidential elections of May
1983. Also in 1982 and 1983 extensive realignments were carried through
with a maximum bilateral devaluation of 10y,.
We consider once more the movements of the various relative positions over
the first six years, which are shown in figure 1(see section 1.1.). In
contemplating these fluctuations, the effects of the realignments on the
relative positions should be taken into account. A realignment implies a
'break' in the development of the relative positions within the EMS-band,
since (some) central rates have been changed and the relative positions
have to be recalculated using these new central rates. Thus the development
of a relative position cannot be represented by a smooth curve, but shows
in principle seven interruptions during the sample periodl). A weak and
therefore devaluated currency will be found temporarily higher (at the top)
1) The graphs in figure 1 reflect the relative positions on the last Friday
of each month, sometimes two or three weeks after a realignment. Never-
theless, most realignments are perceptible as 'jumps' in the graphs.
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within the EMS-band and a strong and revaluated currency temporarily lower
(at the bottom). The relative positions of the Deutsche mark (DM) and Dutch
guilder (NG) for example show clearly a'break' and a temporary weakness
because of the realignments in June 1982 and March 1983. The guilder by and
large followed the development of the mark and was together with the mark
most of the time the strongest currency of the system. As a consequence of
the strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar in 198a, the mark and guilder
became less attractive and depreciated gradually during that year. On the
other hand, the relative position of the Belgian franc (BF) stayed always
in the lower half of the band and frequently at the bottom. The Belgian
franc was often the weakest currency of the system.
We will from now on analyze the influence of the various determinants on
the relative positions in the short term, i.e. on a monthly base. For that
purpose absolute changes of the relative positions (~EMS) are regressed on
absolute or percentage changes of the explanatory variables using monthly
data. To eliminate the distortion resulting from the realignments, the
regressions will include dummies for all realignments according to an
additive dummy-methodi).
2.1. The nominal and real money market interest rates
The most important determinant of monthly changes of the relative position
of a currency is the difference between the domestic and foreign short-term
interest rates, which causes (voluminous) short capital flows with abroad.
Hence the effect of absolute changes of differences in the nominal interest
rate will be examined by means of regression analysis. In this case we have
ehosen the difference between the domestic money market interest rate
(iQ) and a weighted average of the money market interest rate in all EMS-
countries (iECU). The weights roughly correspond with those in the ECU-
baskat (WX)2). Table 2.A. comprises the outcomes of the regressions for
the seven relative positions within the EMS, using Zellner's SUR-method as
1) See S.C.W. Eijffinger, Over de beheersbaarheid van de geldhoeveelheíd -
Een macro-economische analyse voor Nederland, Amsterdam, 1986, pp.
200-203.
2) The pound sterling is not included in the weighted average interest
rate, because the United Kingdom does not participate in the EMS-
exchange rate mechanism. For this reason the weights of the other cur-
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estimation techniquel). In interpreting the size of the coefficients for
interest rate differences, the various weights within the average EMS-
ínte~ri:;;t rrcte :;houlci :{lso be consídered. Thc~ Dutch interest rate for exam-
ple has letis than halt' Lhe weight uf the German interest rate. 'I'herefore,
the coefficients of the interest rate differences have to be corrected with
regard to the weiRhts. Tha relative positions do not seem to be very sensi-
tive fur nominal interest rate differences, since none of the coefficients
is really high. The relation between these differences and the relative
positions appears to be positive for the Deutsche mark and Dutch guilder
and negative for the French franc, Italian lira and Irish pound. For the
Belgian franc and Danish krone though, an insignificant and very poor
relation is found. Figure 3 relates the coefficients of the nominal inter-
est rate differences, adjusted for the weights, to the average inflatíon
rates of the seven countries within the sample period. Evidently, there
exists an inverse correlation between the influence of nominal interest
rates on relative positions and the inflation rates within the EN1S.
Thus a rise of the nominal interest rate leads in a country with low infla-
tion to a higher relative position, but in a country with high inflation to
a lower relative position.
Table 2.B, shows the results of the regressions, if the absolute changes of
differences in the nominal interest rate are lagging behind one month. The
lagged nominal interest rate differences give other outcomes than the un-
lagged differences (in table 2.A.). The relation between the lagged differ-
ences and the relative positions proved to be insignificant and (very) poor
for the Deutsche mark, Italian lira, Danish krone and Irish pound. Never-
theless, for the French franc, Dutch guilder and Belgian franc a strongly
significant and positive relation is found. Despite the remarkable signifi-
cance in the case of these latter currencies, these lagged effects are in
1) The method of SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) takes into account
thr correlation b~~tween disturbances of the separate equations at the
srun~~ tim~~ rrnd r;o pruducf~a rnore efficient rattmat,ions - i.e. with a smal-
ler variancr~ - than Lhe methcrd uf OLS (Urdin,u~y Lc~clt :;yu.arc~s). Compart
A. "l.nllner, An efficient method of estimating sec~ningly unrelated
regressions and tests for aggregation bias. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, vol. 57, June 1962, pp. 348-368.
1s
F'igure 3. Correlation between the effect of nominal interest rate
differences on relative positions and the inflation rates
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our opinion less important than the immedíate effects of interest rate
differences. Evidently, for a highly efficient market, like the exchange
market, the direct influence - within one month -of short-term interest
rates is far more interesting. Consequently, we will focus further only on
unlagged interest rate differences as explanatory variables.
Table 3.A. comprises the results of the regressions, if the weighted ave-
rage money market interest rate within the EMS is replaced by the U.S.
money market interest rate (three-month eurodollarrate, í~S) for the
Deutsche mark and by the German money market interest rate (LpM) for the
other currencies2). The reason for this asymmetrical variant of the nomi-
nal interest rate differences is the dominating role of West-Germany within
the EMS. Moreover, the Deutsche mark is more or less followed by the other
EMS-currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the EMS could thereby be cha-
racteri2ed as a'Deutsche mark-block'. This would also be reflected ín the
money market interest rates in West-Germany and the other EMS-countries.
1) The coefficient for the nominal interest rate difference (a2 in table
2.A.) is adjusted for the weight (WR) in the average EMS-interest
rate: a2 (1 - WR).
2) These and next following regressions have been estimated with the OLS-
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The relation between these interest rate differences and the relative
positions appeared to be insignificant and poor for all currencies. The
asymmetrical variant is apparently less succesful than the symmetrical one
(in table 2.A.) and will further be left aside.
Table 3.8. shows the outcomes of the regressions, if the nominal interest
rate differences are substituted by the real interest rate differences
(rk " rECU)~ i.e. the nominal interest rate differences minus the
inflation rate differences. The connection between the effect of the
nominal interest rate and the inflation rate (see figure 3) points at the
need to distinguish nominal and real interest rates. A rise of the nominal
interest rate could be caused by an increased expected inflation. This
would lead to a lower relative positíon and could explain a negative
relation between nominal interest rates and relative positions. Therefore,
we have to examine the influence of real interest rate differences~). The
relation between these real differences and the relative positions is found
to be insignificant and positive for strong currencies in countries with
low inflation (Deutsche mark and Dutch guilder), but negative for weak
currencies in countries with high inflation (French franc, Italian lira and
Irish pound). Thus the conclusion is the same as for the nominal interest
rate differences.
2.2. The interventions in the exchange market
As a consequence of the bilateral intervention limits (and divergence
thresholds) within the EMS, the exchange market interventions or changes in
the official reserves of the central banks are predominant determinants of
absolute changes of the relative positions concerned. Henceforth, we will
examine the effects of exchange market interventions with regression analy-
sis. The equations including the unlagged nominal interest rate differences
(see table 2.A.) are taken as point of departure. To these equations the
exchange markets interventions (ONFAcb) of the central banks are added as
an extra explanatory variable for the relative positions, which correspond
with the intervening central bank. In some cases (French franc, Danish
krone and Irish pound) no monthly data of the interventions were available
1) As a proxy for the expected inflation rate the actual inflation rate
during the last six months on an annual base is chosen. So the adaptive
expectations hypothesis is assumed.
18
and quarterly data had to be interpolated to monthly data~).
Table 4.A. gives the results of the regressions for nominal interest rate
differences with the exchange market interventíons as an additional
variable2). The relation between the interventions and the relative
positions proved to be positive for most currencies, while a negative sign
would be expected. The coefficient is posítive and significant for the
Dutch guilder and Italian lira and almost signifi~ant for the French franc
and Danish krone. However, for the other currencies the coefficient
appeared to be insignificant and poor, except for the Irish pound.
The outcome of a posítive or poor relation in stead of a negatíve one could
be explained by interventíons of a central bank with regard to other than
its own currency. This seems no plausible hypothesis for most countries
with an exception for West-Germany. A considerable part of the interven-
tions by the Deutsche Bundesbank is directed on the Deutsche mark-dollar
exchange rate and has no connection with the relative position of the
Deutsche mark.
It is more likely that the positive and (almost) significant coefficient
can be attributed to 'reversed causalíty', i.e. a causal relation from the
relative posítion of a currency to the interventions by its central bank. A
rise of the relative position forces the central bank concerned to sell its
own currency, in particular if the upper intervention limít is reached.
Consequently, a positive relation points to the reaction function for the
exchange market policy of a Central bank.
2.3. The accounts of the balance of payments
As commonly known, disequilibria on the current and capital account of the
balance of payments are reflected in the demand for and supply of foreign
currencies in a country and therefore influence the relative position of
its currency. A surplus on the current or capital account implies an import
of foreign currencies and will increase the relative position. The current
account has a more or less equable development ín the short term and will
determine the relative position mainly in the longer run. Though we will
examine the effects of the current account, using regression analysis. On
1) By calculating the moving average of these quarterly data. This leads to
a smoothing of the data, which may affect the significance of the inter-
polated variable.
2) For the Italian lira anc] Irish pound :i shorter sample períod is chosen
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the capital account a distinetion should be made between long and short
capital flows. For the long capital account the same remark holds as for
the current account. However, the short capital account will affect the
relative pusition primarily in the short term. The short interest-índuced
capital flows are already represented in the equations by the nominal
interest rate differences. Besides these flows the short non-interest-
induced capital flows (e.g. short trade credit)~can also ínfluence the
relative position. Since data of the short non-ínterest-induced capital
flows were missing, the short capital account is totally included ín the
equations as a seperate variable. Furthermore, in most cases (except West-
Germany) no monthly data were available and quarterly data had to be
interpolated. For all accounts we expect a positive coefficient.
Table 4.B. comprises the outcomes of the regressions for nominal interest
rate differences with the current account (CU) as an additional variable.
The relation between the current accounts and the relative positions is
found to be almost significant and positive for the Deutsche mark and
Danish krone, but insignificant and very poor for the other currencies.
These results could be caused by the interpolation from quarterly data for
all countries but West-Germany and the lack of reliability in the balance
of payments statistics in many countries.
Tables S.A. and S.B. show the outcomes of the regressions for nominal
interest rate differences with the short capital account (CAS) and the
long capital account (CA~) respectively as additional variables~). The
relation between the short or long capital account and the relative
pc~sitions appeared to be insignificant for all countries. Moreover, the
coefficient has for one or two countries even a wrong, negative sign. This
could also result from the interpolation and unreliability of the data.
Nevertheless, we may conclude that the current and capital account of the
balance of payments in general have no significant influence on the
relative position of a currency in the short run. In the longer term these
accounts will certainly affect the market rate and the relatíve position,
and therefore cause a realignment of the central rate and a change of the
central position.
1) For ireland only annual data of the short and long capital account were
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3. Conclusion
In the previous sections the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and in
particular the relative positions of the currencies within the EMS-band of
fluctuation have been analysed both theoretically and empirically. The
relative positions reflect the development of bilateral market rates within
the parity grid in a multilateral and comparative ~ay.
The modelling of bilateral exchange rates in the short term has been
without much success up to this day, because the short-run fluctuations of
exchange rates are large and volatile. Therefore, the coefficients in these
exchange rate models proved to be mostly instable and so not suited for
making out-of-sample forecastsl). Despite the bilateral fluctuation
margins within the EMS, this volatility of exchange rate movements is also
strongly expressed in the monthly fluctuations of the relative positions of
the EMS-currencies.
Consequently, the modelling of relative positions in the short term
appeared to be complicated as well. The 'fundamentals', such as the long
capital account, the current account, the inflation rate and the growth
rate of the money stock2), determine the relative position of a currency
mainly in the longer run and are thus represented by the realignments of
central rates and the changes of central positions. Nevertheless, these
fundamentals do not affect the short-term development of the relative
positions within the EMS-band.
The short-run determinants of the relative positions appeared to be primar-
ily the nominal interest rate differences and the exchange rate expecta-
tions. The most striking result of this study is the negative relation
between the nominal interest rate and relative posítion for the weak EMS-
currencies of countries with a high inflation rate. This eould be explained
by the exchange rate expectations of the agents on the foreign exchange
markets (banks, investors and speculators), for which the financial
1) In an empirical study of Meese ~ Rogoff ís found that such exchange
rate models cannot forecast more precise than a so-called 'random-walk
model', i.e. a model in which the exchange rate is explained by random
errors. See R. Meese ~ K. Rogoff, The out-of-sample failure of empiri-
cal exchange rate models: Sampling error or misspecification, J.A.
Frankel (ed.), Exchange rates and international maeroeconomics,
Chicago, 1983.
2) Experiments with various differences of the inflation rate and the money
growth rate (over three, six and twelve months on an annual base)
between the EMS-countries resulted in poor and insignificant coeffi-
cients for these explanatory variables.
?3
importance of the expected exchange rate movements often overshadows that
~~f the interest rate diffcrcrnces~),
When the weak currencies are expected to deprecíate, then the relative
positions of these currencies will eventually fall as a kind of 'self-ful-
filling prophecy'. Therefore, the exchangé rate expectations will determine
the relative positions in the short term for a substantial part. They are
however very difficult to model as explanatory "variables2). Because of
the exchange rate expectations the relatíon between the nominal interest
rates and the relative positions is not so clear, as mostly is assumed to
be. This should be taken into aecount in evaluating the exchange market
policy and domestic monetary policy of the various countries within the
EMS. Ultimately, only convergence in monetary and economíc policy between
the EMS-countries will lead to a mitigation of the exchange rate expecta-
tions and to a stabilization of the relative positions wíthin the EMS-band
of fluctuation.
1) An expected depreciation of e.g. 2~ during one month can only be offset
by a nominal interest rate difference of 24~ or more on an annual base.
2) Experiments with various proxies for the exchange rate expectations,
like changes of inflation rate dífferences or changes of the current
account have been tried, but proved to be unsuccessful.
Appendix: Notation of varíables and source o[' data
EMS - relative positions of EMS-currencies (last Friday of the month)
with DM - Deutsche mark, FF - French franc, NG ~ Dutch guilder,
IL - Italian lira, BF - Belgian-Luxembourg franc, DK z Danish krone
and IP - Irish pound (source: De Nederlandsche Bank);
i - money market interest rate
with iDM - three-month cash loan rate , (source: MEI),
1FF s call money rate (source: MEI),
iNG - three-month Treasury bills rate (source: CB),
lIL a six-month Treasury bills rate (source: CB),
iBF s three-month Treasury bills rate (souree: MEI),
iDK ' call money rate (source:
IFS),
i - three-month Treasury bills rate (source: MEI),
and i~s ~ three-month eurodollar rate (source: IFS);
i - 0,351 } 0,2i t 0,151 4 0,11 ; 0,71 t 0,051 t 0,051 ,EcU UM FH' NG IL BF DK IP
p - consumption price índex (~ for Ireland), (source: MEI);
pECU - 0.3~PDM4 0'2PFF} 0,15PNG} 0'~pIL} O~ipBF} O,OSPDK} 0,05pIP ,
NFAcb - official reserves of central bank (adjusted for revaluating),
(billions for Italy and milliards for other countries),
(Source: DM-CB, FF-BPS~, NG-CB, IL-CB, BF-CB, DK-CB~ and IP-CB~);
CU - surplus or deficit on current account
(billions for Belgium and Italy and milliards for other countries),
(Source: DM-CB, FF-BPS~, NG-CB~, IL-CB, BF-BPS~, DK-CB~ and IP-CB~);
CAS - surplus or deficit on short capital account
(billions for Belgium and Italy and milliards for other countries),
(Source: DM-CB, FF-BPS~, NG-BPS~, IL-BPS~, BF-BPS~, DK-BPS~ and
IP-noY, available);
CAL - surplus or deficit on long capital account
(billions for Belgium and Italy and millíards for other countries),
(Source: DM-CB, FF-BPS~, NG-BPS~, IL-BPS~, BF-BPS~, DK-BPS~ and
IP-not available);
Sources: MEI - Main Economic Indicators (OECD);
BPS - Balance of Payments Statistics (IMF);
IFS - International Financial Statistics (IMF);
CB - various monthly and quarterly statistics of the central
banks concerned;
~ - interpolation of quarterly data to monthly data.
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